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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature explaining firm-level heterogenenity in the
extensive margin of trade, defined as the number of products exported by each firm.
We develop a model where firms must invest in R&D to maintain and increase
their portfolio of goods: the process of product innovation by new and incumbent
firms is such that the probability to capture new products is a function of the
number of varieties already exported. This mechanism, together with the entry/exit
dynamics that characterize the economy, gives rise to a Pareto distribution for the
number of products exported by each firm. On the other hand, we model export
sales as depending on exogenous preference shocks on the demand side, which leads
to a lognormal distribution for the intensive margin of trade. Both predictions are
consistent with a number of empirical findings recently emerged in the literature; this
paper provides additional evidence based on a large dataset of French firms. Finally,
a simple extension to the model allows us to derive some interesting insights on
the behavior of multi-products firms: sales of different products across destinations
are not uncorrelated, but show a rather strict hierarchy. Keywords: international
trade, extensive margin, innovation, preferential attachment, multi-product firms.
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1 Introduction
Increasing availability of firm-level data has taught us that firm engagement in interna-
tional markets differs widely. Empirical evidence suggests that this cross-sectional hetero-
geneity is primarily explained by the extensive margin, i.e. the difference in the number of
products exported and/or destinations served by either countries or firms (Bernard et al,
2009).
In a recent contribution, Chaney (2011) discusses how existing trade models featuring
heterogeneous firms (such as Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al, 2003; Chaney, 2008) are unable to
make any prediction on the cross-sectional distribution of the extensive margin. Focusing
on the number of destinations served by each exporter, he then proposes a model based
on social network theory that accurately matches the empirical features of the data.
This paper contributes to the literature on the extensive margin of export (see Arko-
lakis and Muendler, 2010, for another example) by looking at the other component of the
extensive margin of trade, i.e. the number of products exported by each firm. In addition,
we provide a simple explanation for the very skewed distribution that characterizes also
the intensive margin of trade and, by combining the two, we end up with a prediction for
the size distribution of exporting firms. More specifically, we develop a model in the spirit
of Simon (1955); Klette and Kortum (2004); Luttmer (2007) that describes the dynamics
of both the intensive and the extensive margin of firm exports. The former is assumed to
depend on a exogenous preference shock on the demand side, whereas firms must invest
in R&D to maintain and increase their portfolio of goods, so that innovation governs the
extensive margin of trade.
Our setup predicts a lognormal distribution for the intensive margin of trade and
a Pareto distribution for the number of products exported by each firm. This second
result is obtained from the dynamics of firm entry and exit and of the process of product
innovation by new and incumbent firms, whereby the probability to capture new products
is a function of the number of varieties already exported. Both these predictions are
consistent with empirical findings recently emerged in the literature; we provide additional
evidence based on a large dataset of French firms.
A simple extension to the baseline model, namely the inclusion of destination-specific
fixed export costs, leads us to derive some interesting insights on the behavior of multi-
product firms. In contrast with early work on multi-product firms (Bernard et al, 2011),
our setup implies a rather strict hierarchy among products, so that best-selling varieties
in one destination are more likely to be exported to many markets, and will sell a lot
everywhere. This additional implication of the model is consistent with the evidence put
forward by Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) and is further reflected in our data.
A large literature has documented the main empirical regularities that characterize
international trade flows at various levels of aggregation. Moreover, many studies have
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Figure 1: Top: Distribution of the number of product exported by firm, double logarithmic
scale, with power-law fit. Bottom: Distribution of the number of product-destination pairs
by firm, double logarithmic scale, with power-law fit. Data refers to year 2003.
further investigated the features of the different dimensions in which trade flows can be
decomposed: the intensive and the extensive margin (see for instance Bernard et al, 2009).
In a nutshell, what emerges from this body of work is that both margins are characterized
by large and persistent heterogeneity, and this features hold across different countries and
levels of aggregation. Hence, for instance, one learns that most exporting firms ship only
a few products to a small number of foreign destinations (often just one), and that even
at the country level, the most important products or destination markets account for the
bulk of total export (Easterly et al, 2009, label these large flows “big hits” and show they
are very rare).
In this paper we look at data on more than 100 000 French firms in the year 2003
exploiting data collected by the French Custom Service. Figure 1 shows the distribution
of the extensive margin: irrespective of whether we look at the number of products ex-
ported (left panel) or at the combination of product-destination pairs (right panel), the
distributions appear very skewed, and a power-law fit provides a good approximation of
the data.1
Table 1: Number of products exported by each firm: summary statistics. Data refers to
2003 and are classified according to the 8-digit CN (Combined Nomenclature).
mean 7.31
std. dev 26.57 % of firms selling:
min 1.00 only 1 product 39.24
25th percentile 1.00 >10 products 14.96
median 2.00 >100 products 0.63
75th percentile 6.00 >100 products 0.007
max 4140.00
Table 1 provides summary statistics that further characterize the very large hetero-
geneity in the data. While the number of products exported (according to the 8-digit
1The power-law fit is obtained using the methodology described in Clauset et al (2009).
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Combined Nomenclature) ranges between 1 and 4140, 39.24% of firms export a single
product, the median value is 2 and less than 15% of firms export more than 10 products.
Finally, Figure 2 shows the distribution of export sales (in logarithms) of products by
different firms for 2003: the distribution is well approximated by a truncated normal.
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Figure 2: Distribution of log export sales by firm and product, with superimposed trun-
cated normal density. Data for 2003, CN 8-digit classification.
The empirical regularities presented here appear robust to the specific year analyzed
and to the level of aggregation chosen, both in terms of digits of the specific classification
employed and the way export flows are identified (product Vs product-destination pair).
Having laid down the man empirical facts that motivate the paper, in the next Section
we present the baseline version of the model, discuss its main implications, and perform
some empirical analyses to validate them. Section 3 extends the model to consider fixed
export costs and multi-products firms, and look at the relevant empirical evidence. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
Firms are distributed over a finite set of C identical countries and engage in costly trade
(iceberg type). At any time t, each country is populated by a continuum of identical
consumers of measure Ht = He
ηt, where η ≥ 0 is the growth rate of the population.
Time is continuum and denoted by t, with initial time t = 0. At each point in time, the
representative consumer is endowed with one unit of labor and has the following utility
function
4
Ut = Et

 ∞ˆ
t
ln(Xt)e
−ρtdt

 (1)
where ρ > 0 is the discount factor and Xt is a composite good. The differentiated
good Xt is produced with a continuum of varieties
Xt =

 ˆ
ω∈Ωt
at(ω)xt(ω)
σ−1
σ dω


σ
σ−1
(2)
where xt(ω) is consumption of variety ω, at(ω) is a preference shock distributed lognormal
which hits variety ω at time t, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, and
Ωt is total mass of varieties at time t.
2 In each country, the composite good sector consists
of a large group of monopolistically competitive producers. At any point in time, each
variety ω is produced by one and only one firm.
Each variety is produced according to the following production technology
xt = ztlt (3)
where z is labor productivity which is common across varieties and firms. We assume
that z evolves exogenously over time according to zt = ze
θt.
2.1 Households
The representative household maximizes utility subject to a standard budget constraint.
The corresponding first order conditions are
.
Y
Y
= r − ρ (4)
xt(ω) = at(ω)
(
pt(ω)
Pt
)
−σ
Yt
Pt
(5)
where r is the interest rate and Pt =
(´
ω∈Ωt
at(w)pt(ω)
1−σdω
) 1
1−σ
is the price index.
Total household expenditure on the composite good X is
2Lognormally distributed preference shocks would result from a process of “impeded growth” à la
Kalecki (1945) whereby a Gibrat diffusion process is stabilized by relaxing the original assumption that
shocks are independent of size and assuming instead that there is a negative correlation between size and
growth: at(ω) = at−1(ω)
(1−β) ∀t. A possible interpretation for this process is a product life-cycle type of
dynamic: young varieties are subject to higher shocks, i.e. are more volatile, while as products get older
they reach maturity and their volatility decreases.
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ˆω∈Ωt
xt(ω)pt(ω)dω = Yt
Equation (4) is the standard Euler equation and (5) is the demand for variety ω.
We let total expenditure Yt be the numeraire and set it to a constant over every period
implying r = ρ in the balanced growth path.
2.2 Production and Innovation
Trade costs are symmetric and of the standard iceberg type: τ > 1 units shipped result in
1 unit arriving. Since there are no entry costs in the export market, active firms sell both
to the domestic and to the foreign markets. At each point in time, the representative firm
maximizes profits subject to the demand function (5) coming from the domestic and from
the foreign markets. The pricing rule of the firm in the domestic market and in a foreign
market are pd,t(ω) = (σ/(σ − 1))(wt/zt) and pf,t(ω) = (σ/(σ − 1))(wt/zt)τ respectively.
Revenues from sales of variety ω in the domestic market and in a foreign market are
rd,t(ω) = at(ω)
(
pd,t(ω)
Pd,t
)1−σ
Yd,t
rf,t(ω) = at(ω)
(
pf,t(ω)
P Ft
)1−σ
Yf,t
As rf,t(ω) = rd,t(ω)τ
1−σ, total revenues from domestic and foreign sales of variety ω
are rTott (ω) = rd,t(ω) + (C − 1)rd,t(ω)τ
1−σ. Profits from the domestic market a from a
foreign market are
pid,t(ω) = at(ω)
(
σwt
(σ − 1)Pd,t
)1−σ
Yd,t
σ
zσ−1t
pif,t(ω) = at(ω)
(
σwt
(σ − 1)Pf,t
)1−σ
Yf,t
σ
zσ−1t
Total profits from the domestic market and the foreign markets are piTott (ω) = pid,t(ω)+
(C − 1)pid,t(ω)τ
1−σ.
2.2.1 Innovation by incumbents
To increase its portfolio of goods, a firm must invest in R&D activities. We assume that
new innovations arrive following an exponential distributed waiting time with mean
λt = f(it) (6)
where it is labor used in the replication process. We assume that f is increasing and
exhibits strictly decreasing returns to scale. Each firm faces also the probability that
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some firm will innovate over a good it is currently producing. When this event occurs,
the incumbent producer loses the good from its portfolio. An existing variety is lost with
an exponentially distributed waiting time with mean
µt = g(jt) (7)
where jt is labor used to maintain existing products and g is (i) strictly decreasing
and convex. We can rewrite the profits as wl
σ−1
nφ where φ = [1 + (C − 1)τ 1−σ]. The value
of a firm with n product must satisfy the Bellman equation
rtVt(n) = max
λ,µ
Et{wtn
[
lt
σ − 1
φ− (i+ j)
]
+ λn [Vt(n+ 1)− Vt(n)] +
+ µn [Vt(n− 1)− Vt(n)]}.
(8)
The expectation operator is conditional on information at time t. As firms only learn
about the preference shock over a new variety after they succeed in the innovation pro-
cess, they expect to receive the same flow of profits from each innovation. Moreover, as
each innovation guarantees the same expected flow of profits, all firms choose the same
innovation rate λt and maintenance rate µt.
As in Klette and Kortum (2004), the unique solution to (8) must be proportional to
the number of products V (n) = vn. The optimal levels of investment in new varieties and
of maintenance of existing varieties are determined by
λt = f(it) µt = g(jt) vtf
′(it) = −vtg
′(jt) = wt (9)
Intuitively, the innovation process described here suggests that firms base their in-
vestment policy only on the number of products they already export, independently of
whether these products rank high or low in consumers’ preferences (i.e. independently
of the at(ω)). This implies a form of compensation across different products exported
by the same firm: profits generated by “best sellers” make up for the lower-than-average
profits generated by products characterized by low at(ω). Such a result can easily be
accommodated for firms exporting a large number of products (nL), as total profits are
likely to differ only slightly from those obtained from exporting nL times the “average"
product (i.e. a product yielding the average profit). On the other hand, it is possible
that “unlucky" firms selling only a few products (nS) characterized by low at(ω) may be
unable to invest as if they were getting “average” profits. When this happens, then we
could observe some departures from the equilibrium distribution of the number of prod-
ucts exported by firms (whose shape is discussed in Section 2.4 below) in the lower tail of
the distribution.
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2.2.2 Innovation by entrants
New varieties can also be produced from scratch by agents acting as entrepreneurs. At each
point in time, agents are endowed with one unit of effort that can be allocated between
two tasks: supplying labor or producing a new variety. Following Luttmer (2011), we
assume that each agent has a skill vector (x, y), where x corresponds to the rate at which
agents generate a new variety and y is the amount of labor supplied per unit of time.
Agents with skill vectors that satisfy vtx > wty will become entrepreneurs, while agents
with skills vectors that satisfy vtx < wty will supply labor to existing firms.
Let T be a time-invariant talent distribution defined over the set of all possible skill
vectors with finite mean and density ψ. The resulting per capita supply of entrepreneurial
effort is
E(vt/wt) =
ˆ
vtx>wty
xdT (x, y) (10)
for pi ∈ Π. The per capita supply of labor is
L(vt/wt) =
ˆ
vtx<wty
ydT (x, y) (11)
Given a per capita stock of entrepreneurial activities E(vt, wt) and a stock of varieties
Nt, the rate νt at which new entrepreneurs add a new variety is determined by
νtNt = HtE(vt, wt) (12)
Labor market clearing requires
Nt(lt + it + jt) = HtL(vt, wt) (13)
2.3 Balanced growth
Along the balanced growth path, the measure of varieties grows at the rate η. The
allocation of labor is constant (i, j, l). From the consumer’s problem, aggregate variables
wt and Ct grow at a rate k = θ +
η
(σ−1)
with a rate that is larger when goods are less
substitutable. The implied interest rate is r = ρ + k. The Bellman equation (8) implies
that wages and the values of firms must satisfy
v
w
=
l
σ−1
φ− [i+ j]
r − k − [λ− µ]
(14)
where (i, j) and (λ, µ) satisfy (9).
Holding l fixed, these conditions imply that v/w is equal to the maximum subject to
[λ, µ] = [f(i), g(j)] of the right-hand side of equation (14), as log as it is finite. As the
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total number of varieties grows at rate η, new entrepreneurs must contribute at the non-
negative rate η − [λ− µ]. If E(v, w) is positive, from (12) we obtain the entrepreneurial
steady-state supply of varieties
N
H
=
E(v, w)
η − [λ− µ].
(15)
Alternatively, E(v, w) = 0 and η = λ−µ. Along the balanced growth path, the market
clearing condition becomes
N(l + i+ j)
H
= L(v, w) (16)
Luttmer (2011) shows that if ρ+k > k+η and η > f(0)−g(0), for a positive E(v, w),
then equations (9), (14), (15) and (16) define the unique balanced growth path and
η > λ− µ. A balanced growth path can arise with E(v, w) = 0 if the talent distribution
has bounded support. In this case, new varieties are only produced by existing firms.
2.4 The distribution of the number of products exported
In absence of fixed export costs, all active firms sell both to the domestic and to the
foreign markets. A new variety can then be thought as a new trade link. Firms form new
trade links by creating new commodities and lose trade links when some firms innovate
over a good they are currently producing. It follows that one can identify the growth
process of the number of products for an individual firm with the distribution of its links.
Let us define Mn,t the mass of a firm with n products at time t. The aggregate measure
of products is
Nt =
∞∑
n=1
nMn,t. (17)
The change in the number of firms with one commodity over time is
.
M 1,t = µ2M2,t + vNt − (µ+ λ)M1,t (18)
where λ, µ and ν = η− [λ−µ] are constant along the balanced growth path. The number
of firms with one commodity increases because firms with two commodities loses one or
because of entry. The number decreases because firms with one commodity gain or lose
one.
The number of firms with more than one commodity evolves according to
.
Mn,t = λ(n− 1)Mn−1,t + µ(n+ 1)Mn+1,t − (µ+ λ)nMn,t (19)
for all n − 1 ∈ N . A stationary distribution for a firm exists if (18) and (19) have a
solution for which Mn,t
Nt
is constant over time. Since along the balanced growth path N
grows at rate η,
.
Mt = ηMn,t for all n ∈ N . Given that N and Mn grow at the same rate
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η, we can define
Pn =
Mn,t∑
∞
n=1Mn,t
(20)
for all n ∈ N . Equation (20) gives the fraction of firms with n commodities. We can also
define the fraction of all commodities produced by firms of size n as
Qn =
nMn,t∑
∞
n=1 nMn,t
(21)
for all n ∈ N . Using these definitions we can rewrite (18) and (19) as
ηQ1 = µQ2 + v − (λ+ µ)Q1 (22)
1
n
ηQn = λQn−1 + µQn+1 − (λ+ µ)Qn (23)
Luttmer (2011) provides a solution for (22)-(23) in Appendix A of his paper. Luttmer
(2011) shows that if λ, µ, η and ν = η−(λ−µ) are positive, the sequence {βn}
∞
n=0 defined
by the recursion βn = 1/(1− (λβn/µ) + (η + λn)/µn) and the initial condition β0 = 0 is
monotone and converges to min{1, µ/λ}. The only non-negative and summable solution
to equations (22)–(23) is given by
Qn =
ν
λ
∞∑
k=0
1
βn+k
(
n+k∏
m=n
βm
)
n+k∏
m=n
λβm
µ
(24)
For large n and λ 6= µ the distribution satisfies
Qn ∼
ν
| λ− µ |
n−1∏
m=1
λβm
µ
(25)
If ν = 0, the only non-negative and summable solution to equations (22)–(23) is
identically zero, implying that there does not exist a stationary distribution in this case.
If ν > 0, equation (24) adds up to 1 by construction and defines a stationary distri-
bution {Pn}
∞
n=1 via Pn ∝
Qn
n
. The mean number of links of a firm can be written as
1/ (
∑
∞
n=1Qn/n) which is finite by construction.
If λ < µ , Qn is bounded above by a multiple of the geometrically declining sequence
(λ/µ)n. When λ > µ then (λβn/µ) ↑ 1 and (25) declines at a rate that is slower than any
given geometric rate.
Luttmer (2011) shows that under some parameter restrictions the connectivity dis-
tribution features a Pareto tail with a shape parameter greater than unity. If η > 0,
λ > µ and η > λ − µ, then the right tail probabilities Rn =
∑
∞
k=n Pk of the stationary
connectivity distribution satisfy
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lim
n→∞
n
(
1−
Rn+1
Rn
)
= ξ (26)
where ξ = η
(λ−µ)
. That is, Rn is a regularly varying sequence with index −ξ and ξ > 1.
3
2.5 Implications of the model and empirical validation
Our model provides clear predictions for the evolution of both the intensive and the
extensive margin of trade. The assumed evolution of preference shocks gives rise to a
lognormal distribution of export sales for products (Kalecki, 1945). This is consistent
with the empirical findings recently emerged in the empirical literature: in Section 1 we
have shown that the lognormal distribution provides a good fit for the distribution of
exports values by products (Figure 2).
Looking at distribution of export sales however is only one part of the story. In
fact, this results depends on our assumption on preference shocks: assuming a negative
correlation between size and growth (as in Kalecki, 1945) modifies the original Gibrat
result in a way that stabilizes the resulting lognormal distribution, so that its variance no
longer diverges. Kalecki’s model of impeded growth can be validated by looking at the
deviations of (the logs of) product sales from their mean value (see for instance Bottazzi
et al, 2001). In particular, we run an OLS estimation of the following expression:
gi(t) = βgi(t− 1) + εi(t) (27)
where gi(t) = si(t)− s¯(t), si(t) is (the log of) firm size (defined in terms of export sales in
the present context), and s¯i(t) is (the log of) the average size of all firms. A pure Gibrat
process would entail β = 1, whereas the impeded growth hypothesis implies β < 1.
Table 2: Test for “impeded growth”
size(t− 1) 0.846***
(0.002)
constant -0.634***
(0.008)
Observations 430 494
Firms 67 661
R-squared 0.708
F-test: β == 1
p-value 0.000
clustered standard errors (by firm) in parentheses
*** significant at 1%
Table 2 reports the results from OLS estimation of equation (27) where standard
3When the rate ν = η − (λ − µ) goes to zero, the limiting tail index ξ = 1 associated with Zipf’s law
arises.
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errors are clustered at the firm level to account for the possible correlation of observations
pertaining to the same firm. The estimated coefficient is smaller than one (βˆ = 0.846),
and an F-test formally rejects the hypothesis β = 1, thus lending credit to our assumption.
For what concerns the extensive margin, i.e. the number of products exported by each
firm, the model generates a Pareto distribution. We look at the data on export by French
firms in 2003, and run multiple statistical tests to detect the presence of a power-law in the
data. In particular, we apply three different methodologies, namely the uniformly most
powerful unbiased (UMPU) test developed by del Castillo and Puig (1999), the maximum
entropy (ME) test by Bee et al (2011), and the test proposed by Gabaix and Ibragimov
(2011).4
Table 3: Test for power-law upper-tail behavior in extensive margin (data for 2003)
N. products by firm
UMPU 2100
(1.83%)
29.76%
ME 2300
(2.01%)
31.03%
GI 2680
(2.34%)
33.24%
First row: number of observations in power-law tail
Second row: percentage of observations in power-law tail
Third row: share of total num. of products in power-law tail
Table 3 displays the results of the different tests, which identify the number of (the
largest) observations that belong to the power-law upper tail of the distribution. The
three tests are in good agreement and find a power-law behavior limited to the top 2100–
2680 observations. This is small in terms of number of observations, covering roughly 2%
of the sample size, but nonetheless represents one third of all the products in the dataset.
The observation that the lower tail of the connectivity distribution does not follow
a power-law can be rationalized by noting that, as already anticipated in Section 2.2.1
above, the innovation process described in the model assumes all firms invest as if they
were getting “average” profits on all their products. This is not a constrains for firms
exporting a large number of products, as a poor performance by some products can be
compensated by other goods; on the contrary, it is possible that firms selling only a few
“poor” products are constrained in their ability to invest in innovation since their revenues
may be too low.5 If this is the case, then the cumulative process that lies at the core of our
4For a quick overview of the different methodologies see Bee et al (2013).
5The model does not consider the financial system and the possibility that firms can access external
resources. However, it is well known that financing innovation activities is particularly difficult given the
intrinsic uncertainty of the process and of the associated returns.
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model may not properly work, leading to some departures from the Pareto distribution
in the lower tail, as we indeed observe in the data.
The absence of fixed export costs implies that each innovation leads to a new trade
link. As a result, the evolution of the number of goods produced by a firm describes the
dynamics of the number of trade links or the connectivity distribution of that firm. The
growth in the number of varieties (due to population growth) and the dynamics of firm
entry and exit ensures that the right tail of the connectivity distribution follows a Pareto
with a tail index greater than unity (Luttmer, 2007). This prediction is consistent with
the data, where we find of a shape parameter for the Pareto tail of the distribution of the
extensive margin (i.e. number of products by firm) ranging between 1.73 and 1.83.
A further implication of the model has to do with the size of exporting firm, and
results from the combination of the above two results. Growiec et al (2008) show that the
size distribution of business firms depend on the shape of the distribution its components,
namely the number of products sold (the extensive margin n) and the value of sales of
each product (the intensive margin). In particular, when the former is Pareto and the
latter is lognormal, the distribution of firm sales is a lognormal distribution multiplied
by a stretching factor which increases with n: when n is small, the stretching factor is
negligible and the distribution is close to a lognormal; on the contrary, for large n the size
distribution shows a departure that leads to the emergence of a Pareto upper tail.
We look at this prediction of the model by running the three statistical tests used
above (UMPU, ME and GI) on export sales at two different levels of aggregation: first
we take export by firm-product and then total export by firm. Under the assumption of
monopolistic competition each firm produces a different variety, so that export sales by
firm-product represent the empirical counterpart of “products” as defined in the model.
Table 4: Test for power-law upper-tail behavior in export values. Data for 2003 at different
levels of aggregation (by firm-product and by firm)
Total export by
firm-product firm
UMPU 650 400
(0.08%) (0.35%)
43.17% 55.49%
ME 850 800
(0.10%) (0.70%)
46.70% 65.45%
GI 1230 590
(0.15%) (0.51%)
51.71% 61.05%
First row: number of observations in power-law tail
Second row: percentage of observations in power-law tail
Third row: share of total trade in power-law tail
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Table 4 shows that indeed the length of the power-law tail in the data increases upon
aggregation, with the three tests in good agreement. The share of observations belonging
to the Pareto upper tail spans a larger share of the sample: depending on the specific
methodology adopted, the Power-law is 3 to 7 times larger (as a share of the sample) than
the one we observe in disaggregated data. Even if it is still limited to the very top of the
distribution of export sales, the power-law behavior in the upper tail accounts for 55–65%
of total exports (up from 43–51% when looking at product-level data).
3 Extension: Fixed Export Costs
An important extension of the model entails the inclusion of fixed entry costs in foreign
markets. For the sake of clarity, we move one step at a time and first look at what
happens when fixed costs are symmetric across countries. In a second step we relax this
assumption and extend the model to the more interesting case of country-specific fixed
costs.
3.1 Symmetric case
If the entry costs associated with export are equal across destinations, we have that (i)
firms that have captured only (few) low-selling products are prevented from exporting;
(ii) there is hierarchy among products whereby only the best-selling items (those hit by
higher preference shocks) are exported.
As productivity is the same across firms and varieties and fixed export costs are equal
across destinations, whether a product is exported or not only depends on the preference
shock. Let us define a∗as the preference cut-off level which makes profits from selling
variety ω in a foreign market equal to zero a∗t = sup{a : pi
F
t (a) = 0}
As before, profits from selling variety ω in the domestic market are
piDt (ω) = at(ω)
(
σwt
(σ − 1)PDt
)1−σ
Y Dt
σ
zσ−1t (28)
whereas profits from sales into the foreign markets become
piFct = at(ω)
(
σwtτ
(σ − 1)P Fct
)1−σ
Y Ft
σ
zσ−1t − fe (29)
where fe represents the (symmetric) entry costs into a foreign market.
Thus, under the assumptions that country as symmetrical so that Y Dt = Y
F
t , total
profits from a non-exported variety are piDt (ω), and profits from an exported variety are
piTott = pi
D
t φ− fe(C − 1), with φ = [1 + (C − 1)τ
1−σ].
As before, firms only learn about the preference shock on a new variety once they
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succeed in the innovation process. Therefore, they expect to receive the same flows of
profits from each new variety and thus choose the same innovation rate λ and maintenance
rate µ.
The Bellman equation becomes
rtVt(n) = max
λ,µ
Et{wtnt
[
α
lt
σ − 1
+ β
(
lt
σ − 1
φ− fe(C − 1)
)
− (i+ j)
]
+
+λn [vVt(n+ 1)− Vt(n)] + µn [Vt(n− 1)− Vt(n)]}
(30)
where α and β are the fractions of products sold in the domestic and in the foreign markets
respectively and φ = [1 + (C − 1)τ 1−σ].
Finally, equation (14) becomes
v
w
=
α lt
σ−1
+ β
(
lt
σ−1
φ− fe(C − 1)
)
− [i+ j]
r − k − [λ− µ]
. (31)
Equations (22) and (23) still describe the evolution of the fraction of commodities
produced by a firm, but they do not describe the evolution of the number of its trade links
as not all new varieties will be now exported. However, since the number of products sold
by each firm and the preference shocks that determines whether each product is exported
or not are independent, the number of products exported by each firms is simply a random
sample from the overall population of products sold domestically.6 Since a random sample
taken from a power-law follows the same distribution, we can still conclude that the
distribution of the number of exported varieties is power-law. In this respect then, the
introduction of fixed entry costs does not entail any significant change to the implications
of the model, but simply provide us a mechanism to explain the existence of non-exporting
firms.
3.2 Contry-specific fixed costs
A more interesting case is the one issuing from relaxing the assumption of symmetric
countries. More specifically, suppose there are heterogeneous fixed entry cost into foreign
markets (Fj , with j = 1, . . . , C indexing destinations) and that we can order rank countries
on the basis of these fixed entry cost such that F1 < F2 < · · · < FC . This leads us to
derive some further interesting (and more realistic) implications relative to the behavior
of multi-product firms. In particular, there will be a is hierarchy among products whereby
top-selling items are more likely to be shipped to many destinations (see Arkolakis and
Muendler, 2010, for evidence along these lines).
6In fact, as it is common in this class of models, we also have that the range of exported varieties is
a subset of products available domestically. In other words, there are no products that are exported but
not consumed at home.
15
This is in contrast with early work on multi-product firms (Bernard et al, 2011), that
assume sales across markets are uncorrelated, but appears to be consistent with recent
empirical evidence
[. . . ]
3.3 Empirical evidence on multi-product firms
Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) present empirical evidence based on a large sample of
Brazilian firms to show that there is a strict cross-country hierarchy in export sales by
multi-product firms. This is to say that successful products in one market are also best-
sellers in other destinations. In particular, they look at the US and Argentina (Brazil’s
two main export destinations) as reference markets, and compare export behavior there
with export in other markets. They find that, within a firm, the best-selling products in
the reference market have higher sales than other products in all other markets. Indeed,
the rank-correlation between sales in the US (Argentina) and sales in the rest of the world
is as high as 0.837 (0.860). Furthermore, lower ranked products tend to be shipped to
fewer destinations.
[. . . ]
4 Conclusion
We develop a dynamic model of innovation by new and incumbent firms in the spirit of
Klette and Kortum (2004) and Luttmer (2007) where firms must invest in order to capture
new products and maintain their existing portfolio. This process gives rise to a cumulative
dynamic whereby large firms tend to invest more and therefore grow even larger. The
power-law distribution of the number of products exported by each firm well approximates
the data, so that the model provides a novel explanation for the large heterogeneity in
the extensive margin among exporting firms.
Moreover, the model predicts a lognormal distribution of export sales of each product
and the emergence of a power-law tail in the size distribution of exporting firms. Both
these predictions are well matched by data on a large sample of French exporting firms.
[. . . ]
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Appendices
A Household’s problem
The representative household maximizes the following intertemporal utility function sub-
ject to an intertemporal budget constraint
Ut = Et

 ∞ˆ
t
ln(Xt)e
−ρtdt


.
At = rtAt + wt −XtPt
whereXt is a composite good, Pt is the price of the composite good, wt is the wage rate,
and At is the value of the household’s asset holdings. At any period t, the representative
consumer is endowed with one unit of labor. Total spending in final good at t is Yt = PtXt.
The consumer’s problem is solved in two steps.
A.1 First step: dynamic consumption problem
The current value Hamiltonian is
H(Ct, At, vt) = ln(Ct) + vt[rtAt + wt −XtPt]
The first order conditions are
Xt : vt =
1
XtPt
=
1
Yt
(32)
At :
.
vt
vt
= ρ− rt (33)
Taking the time derivative of (28), we get
.
vt
vt
= −
.
Yt
Yt
using (29), we get the standard Euler equation
.
Yt
Yt
= rt − ρ
We set Yt to a constant over every period implying r = ρ in the balanced growth path.
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A.2 Second step: static choice across varieties
The representative consumer chooses the optimal bundle of varieties to consume given its
budget constraint
Xt =

 ˆ
ω∈Ωt
at(ω)xt(ω)
σ−1
σ dω


σ
σ−1
ˆ
ω∈Ωt
xt(ω)pt(ω)dω = Yt
The corresponding first order condition gives the demand function for variety ω
xt(ω) = at(ω)
(
pt(ω)
Pt
)
−σ
Yt
Pt
B The problem of the firm
Let pDDt and x
DD
t be price and quantity for the domestic market and p
DFc
t ,x
DFc
t prices and
quantities for the foreign market.
The representative firm maximizes the following profit function:
pit =
(
pDDt x
DD
t −
wtxt
zt
)
+
C−1∑
c=1
(
pDFct x
DFc
t −
wtxt
zt
τ
)
subject to
xDDt = at
(
pDDt
PDt
)−σ
Y Dt
PDt
C−1∑
c=1
xDFct = at
(
pDFct
P Fct
)−σ
Y Fct
P Fct
The resulting first order conditions give the price for the domestic and the foreign
market respectively
pDDt =
σ
σ − 1
wt
zt
pDFct =
σ
σ − 1
wt
zt
τ
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